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Highlights 
 A court requested an “error margin”, but Marquis et al (2017) recommended:  
 A method based on subjective judgement and not subjected to empirical validation. 
 If a subjective-judgement-based method is used, we argue that it should be:  
 Empirically calibrated. 
 Empirically validated under conditions reflecting those of the case.  
 
 
Abstract 
Marquis et al (2017) [What is the error margin of your signature analysis? Forensic Science International, 281, e1–e8] 
ostensibly presents a model of how to respond to a request from a court to state an “error margin” for a conclusion from 
a forensic analysis. We interpret the court’s request as an explicit request for meaningful empirical validation to be 
conducted and the results reported. Marquis et al (2017), however, recommends a method based entirely on subjective 
judgement and does not subject it to any empirical validation. We believe that much resistance to the adoption of the 
likelihood ratio framework is not to the idea of assessing the relative probabilities (or likelihoods) of the evidence under 
prosecution and defence hypotheses per se, but to what is perceived to be unwarranted subjective assignment of those 
probabilities. In order to maximize transparency, replicability, and resistance to cognitive bias, we recommend the use of 
methods based on relevant data, quantitative measurements, and statistical models. If the method is based on subjective 
judgement, the output should be empirically calibrated. Irrespective of the basis of the method, its implementation should 
be empirically validated under conditions reflecting those of the case at hand. 
Keywords: Likelihood ratio; Subjective judgement; Empirical calibration; Empirical validation 
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Dear Editor: 
A case report [1] recently published in Forensic Science International ostensibly presents a model of 
how to respond to a request from a court to: 
‘Please state, preferably in %, what is the degree of certainty of your conclusions 
[regarding whether a questioned signature was written by a particular known writer]. If, 
even under the best case scenario there remains an unavoidable error margin for this 
analysis according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge, please state what 
that error margin is (preferably in %).’ ([1] p. e1) 
We agree with the response in [1] that the appropriate way for a forensic practitioner to express their 
conclusions is as a numeric likelihood ratio value (which cannot be expressed as a percentage). We 
disagree, however, with the recommendations in [1] as to how a forensic practitioner should generate 
the likelihood ratio value that they report. The method described in [1] used “the knowledge and the 
experience of the examiners” (p. e3) to generate a value for the numerator of the likelihood ratio, and 
used their “knowledge, experience and training” (p. e4) to generate a value for the denominator. The 
likelihood ratio value reported was based entirely on the practitioners’ uncalibrated and untested 
subjective judgement. 
The comments we make in the present letter are with respect to the abovementioned method in general, 
irrespective of the branch of forensic science in which it is applied, and irrespective of legal 
jurisdiction. Nothing we write is intended to be specific to forensic examination of signatures in 
particular. Nor is anything we write intended to be specific to the Swiss judicial system in particular. 
Although we prefer methods based on relevant data, quantitative measurements, and statistical 
models because they are transparent, replicable, and more resistant to cognitive bias, we do not object 
to the use of subjective judgement per se. If subjective judgement is used, however, procedures must 
be adopted to reduce the potential for cognitive bias, the likelihood ratio value generated should be 
empirically calibrated, and the implementation of the whole method must be empirically validated 
under conditions reflecting those of the case.1 For supporting arguments see [3]–[11], for specific 
proposals on how to empirically calibrate human judgements see [12]–[16] (the procedure 
recommended in [17] can also be considered a procedure for generating empirically calibrated 
likelihood ratios [18]), and for descriptions of validation metrics for use within the likelihood ratio 
framework see [19] and [20].  
Data used for training and calibrating an implementation of a method based on quantitative 
measurements and statistical models, or used for calibrating an implementation of a method based on 
                                                 
1 By “implementation” of a method, we mean the method as used by the particular practitioner, see [2] §4.2.8–4.2.11, 
4.3.2. By validation of the “whole” method we mean that the entire set of tools and procedures used to generate a 
likelihood ratio should be tested as a single unified system. Separately validating components of the system would not 
suffice, see [2] §3.3.1–3.3.2. 
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subjective judgement, must be sufficiently representative of the relevant population for the case and 
sufficiently reflective of the conditions of the known and questioned specimens in the case that the 
likelihood ratio value generated is a reasonable answer to the question posed by the competing 
hypotheses specified for the case (e.g., the hypothesis that the questioned specimen came from the 
known source versus the hypothesis that the questioned specimen came from some other source 
selected at random from a specified population). Likewise, data used for empirically testing the 
performance of an implementation of a method, irrespective of whether is it is based on quantitative 
measurements and statistical models or on subjective judgement, must be sufficiently representative 
of the relevant population for the case and sufficiently reflective of the conditions of the known and 
questioned specimens in the case that the test results provide a meaningful indication of how well the 
method works under the conditions of the case. If such data cannot be obtained, then meaningful 
empirical validation cannot be conducted, and the court lacks the information necessary for deciding 
on the extent to which it can trust a forensic practitioner’s conclusion. Hence, with respect to 
admissibility, empirical demonstration of a sufficient level of performance under conditions pertinent 
to the case at hand is required by United States Federal Rule of Evidence 7022 and the criteria set out 
in the Daubert trilogy of Supreme Court rulings,3 and is also recommended by section 19A of the 
England & Wales Criminal Practice Directions4 (see [3] and [21]). That obtaining case-relevant data 
for testing (and for training and calibration) may be financially costly and time consuming ([1] p. e3) 
does not absolve forensic practitioners from the requirement to conduct empirical validation under 
casework conditions. As President Obama’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology stated: 
neither experience, nor judgment, nor good professional practices (such as certification 
programs and accreditation programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and 
codes of ethics) can substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and reliability. 
The frequency with which a particular pattern or set of features will be observed in 
different samples, which is an essential element in drawing conclusions, is not a matter 
of “judgment.” It is an empirical matter for which only empirical evidence is relevant. 
Similarly, an expert’s expression of confidence based on personal professional experience 
or expressions of consensus among practitioners about the accuracy of their field is no 
substitute for error rates estimated from relevant studies. For forensic feature-comparison 
methods, establishing foundational validity based on empirical evidence is thus a sine qua 
non. Nothing can substitute for it. ([17] p. 6, emphasis in original) 
Our interpretation of the court’s request for an “error margin” to be stated ([1] p. e1), is that this was 
an explicit request for meaningful empirical validation to be conducted and the results reported.5 We 
                                                 
2 Federal Rules of Evidence as amended Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000; Apr. 26, 2011, eff. Dec. 1, 2011. 
3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
4 Criminal Practice Directions [2015] EWCA Crim 1567. 
5 Although “error margin” literally appears to specify precision (reliability), we doubt that such a narrow interpretation 
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think it perverse to title a paper “What is the error margin of your signature analysis?” but to 
recommend the use of a subjective-judgement-based method that has not undergone any empirical 
validation. The discussion of the use of Bayes’ theorem in [1] §3 is factually correct, but it appears 
to us to have been used to obfuscate with respect to the court’s request for meaningful empirical 
validation. 
As stated in [22], we believe that “Much resistance to the adoption of the likelihood ratio framework 
is not to the idea of assessing the relative probabilities (or likelihoods) of the evidence under 
prosecution and defence hypotheses per se, but to what is perceived as unwarranted subjective 
assignment of those probabilities” ([22] p. 472). We are advocates of the use of the likelihood ratio 
framework, but not of likelihood ratio values based on uncalibrated and untested subjective 
judgement. Likelihood ratio value should preferably be based on relevant data, quantitative 
measurements, and statistical models. If they are based on subjective judgement, they should be 
empirically calibrated and procedures should be adopted to reduce the potential for cognitive bias. 
Irrespective of the basis of the method, its implementation should be empirically validated under 
conditions reflecting those of the case at hand. 
Sincerely 
Authors
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s 
                                                 
was intended by the court, and it would not make sense to test precision without also testing accuracy (validity). Note that 
in Daubert footnote 9 “evidentiary reliability” was equated with “scientific validity” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 1993). 
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